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In the Supren1e Court of the
State of Utah
LARRY L. JONES and DELLA MAE
JONES, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

Case No.
9240

GROW INVESTMENT and MORTGAGE COMPANY,
·. Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
STATE ME NT OF FACTS
This action was brought for breach of warranty against encumbrances contained in a warranty deed conveying real pr~perty in Orem, Utah
from appellant to respondents. The encumbrance
complained of is a prescriptive right to an irrigation ditch which transversed the property sold to
respondents. In connection with the construction
of the house thus purchased, the ditch was moved
in its location upon the premi~es, but the substituted ditch continues to cross on two sides the
lot purchased by respondents.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The case was tried to ~he court sitting without a jury. There is a direct conflict in the evidence on material issues. In its brief, appellant
has set forth as its statement of facts the evidence
as it was presented on behalf of appellant. Because the trial court found otherwise, we shall
present our statement of fact by means of a direct
qu9tation of the findings of fact as made by the
court, with citations to the transcript in support
thereof:
"1. At some time in the latter part of October,
1958, the plaintiff, (respondent) Larry L. Jones,
made a personal inspection of Lot 3, Block 4, Plat
"B," Keyridge Heights Subdivision, Utah County,
Utah, in the company of an agent of the defendant
(appellant) for the purpose of considering purchasing the property (Tr. 22, 69, 72).
"2. That at such time, the plaintiff, (respondent) Larry L. Jones, saw a visible open irrigation
ditch across the rear of the said property, said
ditch appearing to dead-end at the south line of
said lot (Tr. 22-23).
"3. That at that time, the ditch appeared to
be abandoned and there was present therein tree
limbs, building refuse, weeds, and trash (Tr. 2223, 28~ 30, 73).
"4. That at that time, there was also on the
premises, but not revealed to the plaintiff, (respondent) Larry L. Jones, a 22 inch diameter cement
pipe running in a westerly direction from the end
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of the rear open ditch along the south line of the
property, said cement pipe being completely covered and not visib~e on a casual inspection, and
that said covered pipe continued across the street
and away from the premises (Plaintiffs' Exhibits
1, 3, Defendant's Exhibit 7. Tr. 73).
"5. That the plaintiff, (respondent) Larry L.
Jones inquired of the defendant's (appellant's)
agent whether or not the open ditch could be filled,
as he wanted to completely enclose the rear yard
and make it secure for a child and a dog (Tr. 23,
73-74, 150).
"6. That the defendant's (appellant's) agent
represented that the ditch could be filled in, and
the yard leveled (Tr. 150).
"7. That the plaintiffs (respondents) then agreed to purchase said premises and that on or about
December 12, 1958, in consideration of the sum of
of $19,500.00 to it paid, the defendant (appellant)
conveyed said premises to the plaintiffs (respondents) by warranty deed, in fee simple (Plaintiffs'
Exhibit A; Tr. 68).
"8. That said warranty deed was without restriction or exception, except for deed restrictions
and easements of record, (Plaintiffs' Exhibit A).
"9. That there was, and is no easement of record for said irrigation ditch, (Plaintiffs' Exhibit
5).
"10. That immediately after taking possession of said.premjses, the plaintiffs (respondents)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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·proceeded to fill in the ditch across the rear of
said lot, and thereupon learned that there was a
claimed easement by prescription across the premises for said irrigation ditch (Tr. 5, 16-19, 24, 31,).
"11. That there is in fact a prescriptive easement in others for an irrigation ditch across the
premises of plain tiffs (respondents), described
above, and that said easement is actively used by
the owners of the dominant estate (Tr. 6-8, 9, 12-14,
16).
''12. That· by reason of the burdens of said
easement, the plaintiffs (respondents) have been
damaged in the amount of $750.00 (Tr. 25, 28, 39,
47)."
The Court has pronounced innumerable times
the rule that, where the evidence upon the trial
was sufficient to support the trial court's findings,
this Court would not disturb such findings on appeal S:ee Dusenberry Vs. Taylor's, 7 Utah 2d 383,
325 P2d 910..
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THIS CASE TURNS ON ISSUES OF FACT
ON BREACH OF WARRANTY AGAINST ENCUMBRANCES DECIDED BY THE TRIAL
COURT ON SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE, AND
THIS COURT NEED NOT DECIDE QUESTIONS OF LAW URGED BY APPELLANT.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT II
IN URGING RESPONDENTS WERE NOT
DAMAGED, APPELLANT IGNORES THE
FINDINGS OFF ACT AND THE APPLICABLE
LAW.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS CASE TURNS ON ISSUES OF FACT
ON BREACH OF WARRANTY AGAINST ENCUMBRANCES DECIDED BY THE TRIAL
COURT ON SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE, AND
TIONS OF LAW URGED BY APPE~LLANT.
The appellant conveyed the property in question to the respondents by the usual statutory warranty deed form (57-1-12 Utah Code Annotated
1953) which cpntains, amongst other things, by
operation of law a warranty "that the premises
are free from all encumbrances" (Exhibit A). The
only exception contained on said deed was the
statement "subject to deed restrictions and easements of record.'' The trial court found that the
property in fact was subject to an active prescriptive easement, not of record, for an irrigation ditch
(R. 27, Findings of Fact No. 10 and No. 11).
Courts are not in agreement on the question
whether there is an implied exception to the covenant against encumbrances where the irrigation

ditch is visible and its existence known to the
vendee. Annotation, 64ALR 1479, "Easements as
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Breach of Covenant against Encumbrances" at
page 1499.
The Supreme Court of Idaho, in the case of
Schurberg Vs. Moorman, 117 Pac. 122, 20 Idaho 97,
held there was such an implied exception where
canals existed o:r farming land improved under
the Carey Act. The Supreme Court of Colorado,
in the case of Ericksen Vs. Whitescarver, 142 Pac.
413, 57 Colo. 409, held to the contrary where the
ditch was found to be across. a lot in a subdivision.
We have found no Utah cases dealing with the
legal question urged by appellant. The appellant
cites none. The case of Rollo Vs. Nelson, 34 Utah
116, 96 Pac. 263, is distinguished in two respects.
That case involved a sidewalk running across several lots. It was completely obvious to anyone who
looked, and the agent of the complaining party had
been upon the premises and had seen the walk.
Second, the easement was mutualy beneficial to
the property owners, including the one complaining thereof.
This Court, in the case of VanCott Vs. Jacklin,
63 Utah 412, 226 Pac. 460, treated of covenants of
e:eneral warranty and for quiet enjoyment where a
part of the land conveyed was lost because of an
ancient existing fence which did not follow the
.property line. This Court, in that opinion, commented upon the question of breach of warranty
against encumbrances such as the one involved in
this case, as follows:
',·

1.; ..
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" ... we do not wish to be understood as passing upon the question of liability of a covenantor
in case there is an open water ditch or private
right of way over lands which are the subject of
warranty. Where such is the case, it is evident that
such constitute easements and are covered by the
warranty against encumbrances. The decisions
as to the effect of such covenants in case there are
easements which are . open and visible, or are
known to the purchaser before he purchases, are
not uniform, and for that reason, as well as for
the reason that the question is not necessarily involved, we expre~·S no opinion upon the subject.''
(Emphasis added).
We respectfully but strenuously urge that
this Court, in the case at bar, is still not called
upon to express such opinion. The facts found by
the trial court exclude this case from the authorities relied upon by the appellant. They are not in
point. The findings of the trial court shows that
the easement here complained of was not open and
visible (R. 26-7; Tr. 22-23, 28, 30, 73-74, 150). They
further show that the agent of the appellant actively represented that there was no such easement
and that the respondents could proce~d to fill what
appeared to be a dead ditch at the rear of their lot
(Tr. 23, 150). Although the authorities cited by
appellant may well be good law, we maintain that
this Court need not decide the issue as urged by
the appellant, for the simple reason that the facts
here concerned render the authorities immaterial.
In Points I to VIII inclusive of its brief, appellant simply qt1arrels with the trial court's findings of fact. It is further observed that the arguSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ment under Point VI of appellant's brief ignores
the fact that the court viewed the premises (Tr.
4).
POINT II
IN URGING RESPONDENTS WERE NOT
DAMAGED, APPELLANT IGNORES THE
FINDINGS OF FACT AND THE APPLICABLE
LAW.
Under Point IX of its brief, appellant urges
that the respondents were not damaged at all and
that the court erred in finding damages. Here
_again, it ignores the record and the trial court's
·fin_dings of fact.
The measure of damages in an action on a
covenant against encumbrances when ~he encumbrance is of a nature that it cannot be removed or
discharged is that am~unt of money which is a
just compensat:lon t<? th_e covenantee f~r the real
inju~y resulting from the encumbrance. Annotation 61 ALR 11, at page 72 arid following, "Measure
of da~ages for bi··each of covenants of title in conveyances or mortgages of real property," supplemented in 100 ALR 1194 at page 1199.
Mr'. Delmar C. Kenner testified that the value
of the property was depreciated by the existance
·of th·e· ditch along the east and south sides of the
p~operty in the amount of $1,971.~0 (Tr. 39). He
was qualified as an expert witness and was subjected to extensive cross examination. Three witnesses were called by the appellant to rebut this.
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Little profit wou]d come from belabouring their
testimony here. Mr. J. Edwin Stein, as a review of
his testimony will indicate, had only made a casual
inspection of the premises, dealt in vague generalities and was unalterably opposed to giving any
direct answer. Other witnesses for the appellant
were little, if any better, prepared and we submit
that their testimony was of small service to the
trial court.
Suffice it to say that the trial court awarded
as damages less than one-half the sum that Mr.
Kenner's testimony would have supported. The
court determined that the respondents were in
truth damaged, and the award of the trial court
was most modest.
CONCLUSION
We submit that this case is determined by
questions of fact, not of law, and that the evidence
well supports the facts as found by the trial court.
Because this Court has consistently refused to
substitute its judgment on credibility of witnesses
for that of the trier of the fact, this appeal is
frivolous. The judgment of the trial court should
be affirmed.
Respectfuly submitted,
Allen B. Sorensen, for
YOUNG, YOUNG & SORENS,EN
Attorney~ for Plaintiffs & Respondents
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